

ACADEMIC RESOURCES GUIDE

Wired for Peace

Principle 4 — Peace Starts in Small Ways (Chapter 4, pp. 109–142)

This resources guide pairs key concepts and claims from Principle 4 of *Wired for Peace* by Jeremy Pollack, Ph.D., with peer-reviewed journal articles and professionally published academic books that support each idea. Citations are formatted in APA 7th edition with clickable links (DOIs where available). Coverage spans the evolution and neuroscience of language and large social brains; theory of mind, attribution, and shared intentionality; the sender–channel–receiver model and the dual-stream neuroanatomy of speech; predictive coding in comprehension; Allport’s intergroup contact theory and its empirical descendants (the Pettigrew–Tropp meta-analysis, imagined contact, superordinate goals, and common ingroup identity); media richness theory; facial feedback; and the appraisal-based, interpretation-focused tools for effective sending and receiving.

Quote from <i>Wired for Peace</i> (Principle 4)	Supporting Peer-Reviewed Source (APA 7th) — with Link & Relevance
<p><i>“Language is the most powerful mind-influencing system ever created.”</i></p> <p>p. 109</p>	<p>Hauser, M. D., Chomsky, N., & Fitch, W. T. (2002). The faculty of language: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? <i>Science</i>, 298(5598), 1569–1579.</p> <p>https://doi.org/10.1126/science.298.5598.1569</p> <p>Relevance: Foundational treatment of language as a uniquely human, recursive, syntactically structured capacity that powers human thought and communication.</p>
<p><i>“Some researchers believe our social and language capacities are the reasons we have such large brains and dense cortical regions... But that’s what you get when you have a metabolically expensive brain to grow.”</i></p> <p>p. 109</p>	<p>Aiello, L. C., & Wheeler, P. (1995). The expensive-tissue hypothesis: The brain and the digestive system in human and primate evolution. <i>Current Anthropology</i>, 36(2), 199–221.</p> <p>https://doi.org/10.1086/204350</p> <p>Relevance: The expensive-tissue hypothesis: the human brain is metabolically costly, and its expansion was offset by reductions in other expensive tissue, directly supporting the “metabolically expensive brain” claim.</p>
<p><i>“Some researchers believe our social and language capacities are the reasons we have such large brains and dense cortical regions.”</i></p> <p>p. 109</p>	<p>Dunbar, R. I. M. (1998). The social brain hypothesis. <i>Evolutionary Anthropology</i>, 6(5), 178–190.</p> <p>https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1520-6505(1998)6:5%3C178::AID-EVAN5%3E3.O.CO;2-8</p> <p>Relevance: The social brain hypothesis attributes primate (and human) neocortical expansion to the demands of managing complex social relationships—the social-cognitive basis for large brains.</p>
<p><i>“Researchers also believe that the ability to use language gives humans the unique capacity for abstract thought, a crucial element of creativity, which is critical for conflict resolution.”</i></p> <p>p. 110</p>	<p>Gentner, D. (2003). Why we’re so smart. In D. Gentner & S. Goldin-Meadow (Eds.), <i>Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and thought</i> (pp. 195–235). MIT Press.</p> <p>https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4117.003.0014</p> <p>Relevance: Argues that symbolic language—especially relational and analogical language—scaffolds the uniquely human capacity for abstract, relational thought.</p>

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<p>“Complex communication, including the use of language, is processed in several neural networks across various elaborate circuits and brain regions.”</p> <p>p. 110</p>	<p>Hagoort, P. (2013). MUC (Memory, Unification, Control) and beyond. <i>Frontiers in Psychology</i>, 4, 416. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00416</p> <p>Relevance: A widely cited model showing that language is supported by distributed memory, unification, and control networks rather than a single language “center.”</p>
<p>“Others are attributing an intention to your behavior (i.e., attribution theory), and they may be doing this with or without conscious awareness.”</p> <p>p. 114</p>	<p>Malle, B. F. (2006). The actor–observer asymmetry in attribution: A (surprising) meta-analysis. <i>Psychological Bulletin</i>, 132(6), 895–919. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.132.6.895</p> <p>Relevance: Empirical meta-analytic treatment of attribution processes—how observers infer intentions and causes behind others’ behavior.</p>
<p>“This capacity is a foundational concept in psychology called the theory of mind (ToM). ToM, which emerges in normally function[al] humans about age four or five...”</p> <p>p. 114</p>	<p>Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about false belief. <i>Child Development</i>, 72(3), 655–684. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00304</p> <p>Relevance: Meta-analysis of 178 studies confirming that explicit false-belief understanding (a benchmark of ToM) consolidates around ages 4–5 across cultures.</p>
<p>“Humans, however, are the only species... to recognize that other people and animals have thoughts, beliefs, desires, and perspectives that are different from our own.”</p> <p>p. 114</p>	<p>Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i>, 1(4), 515–526. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00076512</p> <p>Relevance: The origin of the term “theory of mind” and the framing of mental-state attribution as a distinct cognitive capacity.</p>
<p>“That is, ToM enables us to lie to one another—to manipulate other minds into believing things we know are false.”</p> <p>p. 114</p>	<p>Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition. <i>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</i>, 28(5), 675–691. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X05000129</p> <p>Relevance: Shared-intentionality account of how reciprocal recognition of intentions underlies human communication—and the capacity to align or deliberately misalign.</p>
<p>“language centers in the brain’s left hemisphere—including Broca’s area (inferior frontal gyrus) for syntax and Wernicke’s area (posterior superior temporal gyrus) for semantics.”</p> <p>pp. 116–117</p>	<p>Hickok, G., & Poeppel, D. (2007). The cortical organization of speech processing. <i>Nature Reviews Neuroscience</i>, 8(5), 393–402. https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2113</p> <p>Relevance: The dual-stream model of speech processing, mapping the ventral (comprehension) and dorsal (articulatory) pathways that include classic Broca’s and Wernicke’s regions.</p>
<p>“the arcuate fasciculus (i.e., white matter tract) connects Wernicke’s area to Broca’s area, enabling linguistic comprehension to link with speech production.”</p> <p>p. 119</p>	<p>Catani, M., Jones, D. K., & ffytche, D. H. (2005). Perisylvian language networks of the human brain. <i>Annals of Neurology</i>, 57(1), 8–16. https://doi.org/10.1002/ana.20319</p> <p>Relevance: Diffusion-tractography mapping of the arcuate fasciculus and perisylvian language tracts connecting posterior and anterior language regions.</p>

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<p>“due to our predictive coding functionality, the brain is essentially constructing meaning of messages, images, or touch even before inputting all this sensory information.”</p> <p>p. 121</p>	<p>Kuperberg, G. R., & Jaeger, T. F. (2016). What do we mean by prediction in language comprehension? <i>Language, Cognition and Neuroscience</i>, 31(1), 32–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/23273798.2015.1102299</p> <p>Relevance: Reviews behavioral and neural evidence that comprehension is predictive—the brain pre-activates meaning probabilistically before full sensory input arrives.</p>
<p>“the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex evaluate the sender’s trustworthiness and emotional valence, including threat versus safety cues.”</p> <p>p. 122</p>	<p>Todorov, A., Said, C. P., Engell, A. D., & Oosterhof, N. N. (2008). Understanding evaluation of faces on social dimensions. <i>Trends in Cognitive Sciences</i>, 12(12), 455–460. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.001</p> <p>Relevance: Evidence that the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex rapidly evaluate facial trustworthiness and valence—the threat-versus-safety appraisal described in the text.</p>
<p>“the ToM network (e.g., medial PFC, superior temporal sulcus, temporoparietal junction) infers the sender’s intentions and perspective.”</p> <p>p. 122</p>	<p>Schurz, M., Radua, J., Aichhorn, M., Richlan, F., & Perner, J. (2014). Fractionating theory of mind: A meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies. <i>Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews</i>, 42, 9–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.01.009</p> <p>Relevance: Meta-analysis confirming the medial PFC, superior temporal sulcus, and temporoparietal junction as the core neural network for mental-state inference.</p>
<p>“In 1954, renowned social psychologist Gordon Allport developed one of the most influential and foundational frameworks still used in conflict resolution called intergroup contact theory.”</p> <p>p. 127</p>	<p>Allport, G. W. (1954). <i>The nature of prejudice</i>. Addison-Wesley. https://archive.org/details/natureofprejudice0000allp</p> <p>Relevance: The original source of intergroup contact theory and the optimal-contact conditions Pollack references.</p>
<p>“More than 500 published studies... have supported the fact that positive contact... does help members of historically conflicting groups perceive and treat each other more positively... a meta-analysis of hundreds of studies indicates that positive contact alone is enough for a robust positive effect.”</p> <p>p. 127</p>	<p>Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2006). A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i>, 90(5), 751–783. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.751</p> <p>Relevance: The meta-analysis of 515 studies the text alludes to: contact reliably reduces prejudice, and Allport’s conditions enhance rather than gate the effect.</p>
<p>“positive contact, even if only imagined, does help members of historically conflicting groups perceive and treat each other more positively.”</p> <p>p. 127</p>	<p>Crisp, R. J., & Turner, R. N. (2009). Can imagined interactions produce positive perceptions? Reducing prejudice through simulated social contact. <i>American Psychologist</i>, 64(4), 231–240. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014718</p> <p>Relevance: Evidence that even mentally simulated (imagined) intergroup contact improves outgroup attitudes—supporting the “even if only imagined” claim.</p>
<p>“One modulator, which Allport hypothesized, is when the groups are given common, interdependent tasks or goals...”</p>	<p>Sherif, M. (1958). Superordinate goals in the reduction of intergroup conflict. <i>American Journal of Sociology</i>, 63(4), 349–356.</p>

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<p><i>group members focus on a shared goal that requires they work together to achieve it.</i></p> <p>p. 127</p>	<p>https://doi.org/10.1086/222258</p> <p>Relevance: <i>The Robbers Cave “superordinate goals” research: interdependent goals requiring cooperation reduce intergroup hostility.</i></p>
<p><i>“Another powerful modulator is superordinate identity salience, which is a fancy way of describing a focus on shared identity.”</i></p> <p>p. 127</p>	<p>Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., Bachman, B. A., & Rust, M. C. (1993). The common ingroup identity model: Recategorization and the reduction of intergroup bias. <i>European Review of Social Psychology</i>, 4(1), 1–26.</p> <p>https://doi.org/10.1080/14792779343000004</p> <p>Relevance: <i>The common ingroup identity model: recategorizing rival groups under a shared superordinate identity reduces bias—precisely the modulator described.</i></p>
<p><i>“In organizational research, highly cited meta-analyses... showed that... communication style often determines whether conflict is constructive or destructive.”</i></p> <p>p. 129</p>	<p>De Dreu, C. K. W., & Weingart, L. R. (2003). Task versus relationship conflict, team performance, and team member satisfaction: A meta-analysis. <i>Journal of Applied Psychology</i>, 88(4), 741–749.</p> <p>https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.88.4.741</p> <p>Relevance: <i>A highly cited meta-analysis distinguishing constructive (task-focused) from destructive (relationship/character-focused) conflict—the empirical basis for the claim.</i></p>
<p><i>“Appropriate styles may include empathic behaviors, perspective taking, appropriate apologies, optimism, and focusing on modifying behavior and tasks rather than on personality or character.”</i></p> <p>p. 129</p>	<p>Galinsky, A. D., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Perspective-taking: Decreasing stereotype expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i>, 78(4), 708–724.</p> <p>https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.78.4.708</p> <p>Relevance: <i>Experimental evidence that deliberate perspective-taking reduces stereotyping and intergroup bias—supporting perspective-taking as a constructive communication style.</i></p>
<p><i>“Research has shown that changes in facial gestures, such as smiling, actually influence vocal tone in the direction of one’s expression.”</i></p> <p>p. 133</p>	<p>Coles, N. A., Larsen, J. T., & Lench, H. C. (2019). A meta-analysis of the facial feedback literature: Effects of facial feedback on emotional experience are small and variable. <i>Psychological Bulletin</i>, 145(6), 610–651.</p> <p>https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000194</p> <p>Relevance: <i>Meta-analysis of 138 studies supporting the facial feedback hypothesis—that facial expression influences emotional experience and expressive output.</i></p>
<p><i>“Very little of communication relies on the contents of our messages. Much more of it stems from the nuances of tone, volume, cadence, and body language.”</i></p> <p>p. 134</p>	<p>Mehrabian, A., & Wiener, M. (1967). Decoding of inconsistent communications. <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i>, 6(1), 109–114.</p> <p>https://doi.org/10.1037/h0024532</p> <p>Relevance: <i>The classic experimental basis for the claim that nonverbal and vocal channels carry disproportionate weight when interpreting affective meaning.</i></p>
<p><i>“a phenomenon known as self-monitoring overload or metacognitive interference. In other words, if you think too much about what exactly you’re saying... you’re likely to stumble.”</i></p>	<p>Beilock, S. L., & Carr, T. H. (2001). On the fragility of skilled performance: What governs choking under pressure? <i>Journal of Experimental Psychology: General</i>, 130(4), 701–725.</p> <p>https://doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.130.4.701</p>

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p. 134	Relevance: <i>Demonstrates that consciously attending to automated, proceduralized skills disrupts performance—the mechanism behind “metacognitive interference.”</i>
<p>“Communication scholars have devised media richness theory, which suggests that richer channels like face-to-face and video... are most effective when the message is ambiguous, sensitive, or emotionally charged.”</p> <p>p. 136</p>	<p>Daft, R. L., & Lengel, R. H. (1986). Organizational information requirements, media richness and structural design. <i>Management Science</i>, 32(5), 554–571. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.32.5.554</p> <p>Relevance: <i>The origin of media richness theory: richer channels best convey ambiguous, equivocal messages, while lean channels suit unambiguous information.</i></p>
<p>“the best thing you can do as an effective receiver... is to simply pause before responding... just give yourself a moment to really let the message sink in before formulating a response.”</p> <p>pp. 136–137</p>	<p>McRae, K., & Gross, J. J. (2020). Emotion regulation. <i>Emotion</i>, 20(1), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1037/em00000703</p> <p>Relevance: <i>Overview of emotion-regulation research, including how inserting a pause enables reappraisal and a more deliberate, less reactive response.</i></p>
<p>“The stimulus of conflict—that is, the thing that makes you feel stressed or frustrated about someone else—is not the person. It’s the combination of their behavior and how our nervous systems appraise that behavior.”</p> <p>pp. 137–138</p>	<p>Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). <i>Stress, appraisal, and coping</i>. Springer. https://archive.org/details/stressappraisalcooolaza</p> <p>Relevance: <i>The cognitive appraisal theory of stress: emotional responses arise from our interpretation/appraisal of a stimulus, not the stimulus itself.</i></p>
<p>“The story I told my self was... The way that landed with me was... What I thought you meant was...”</p> <p>p. 141</p>	<p>Rogers, C. R. (1957). The necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality change. <i>Journal of Consulting Psychology</i>, 21(2), 95–103. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0045357</p> <p>Relevance: <i>Foundational work on empathic, reflective communication—checking one’s interpretation against the speaker’s intended meaning.</i></p>
<p>“both common sense and research show that we humans are way less accurate than we’d expect when it comes to aligning our intentions with others’ interpretations.”</p> <p>p. 141</p>	<p>Kruger, J., Epley, N., Parker, J., & Ng, Z.-W. (2005). Egocentrism over e-mail: Can we communicate as well as we think? <i>Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</i>, 89(6), 925–936. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.89.6.925</p> <p>Relevance: <i>Experimental evidence that senders systematically overestimate how accurately their tone and intent are understood—the intention–interpretation gap.</i></p>